CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION IN
ANTITRUST LAW: A COMMENT ON
ORDOVER AND ATWOOD
DIANE P. WOOD*

I
INTRODUCTION

Conflicts of jurisdiction among nations over the application of economic
policy regulations like antitrust laws inevitably arise when international trade
links the world so closely. Dr. Ordover and Mr. Atwood have looked at this
problem through the large and the small end of the binoculars, respectively.
Ordover has sketched broad categories of industrial policy where nations
should and should not defer to one another's jurisdictional primacy; Atwood
takes the rather rare case of a "pure export cartel" and concludes that
national antitrust enforcers should go out of business when such cartels meet
his specified criteria. Each author has made a number of interesting
suggestions, but each has failed to recognize adequately the nature of a
jurisdictional conflict, and to note the difference between resolution of such
conflicts by means of jurisdictional rules and resolution of such conflicts in
other ways. This article will sketch out the critical preliminary analysis and
indicate the way in which it affects each author's conclusions.
II
THE NATURE OF JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS

A great deal of ink has been spilled in recent years explicating this subject,
much of it by the American Law Institute in its recently completed project to
revise the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States.' In
brief, there can be at least two kinds of "jurisdictional" conflicts. The first and
most fundamental conflict relates to the prescriptive jurisdiction of a nation,
its competence under international law to create or to prescribe rules of
conduct or status. The recognized bases of prescriptive jurisdiction include
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territoriality and nationality. 2 In other words, nations are entitled to
prescribe rules that will control conduct or status for anyone located within
the state's territorial area, and nations are entitled to prescribe rules that their
citizens or subjects must obey. (The son of territorial jurisdiction, whose
legitimacy has been debated sporadically at least since the case of the S.S.
Lotus before the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927, 3 is referred
to as "effects jurisdiction" or "objective territoriality.") Two nations often
have concurrent prescriptive jurisdiction, since a national of one may easily
find himself or herself within the territory of another. No real "conflict of
jurisdiction" arises in most of these cases, even if the two countries in
question have prescribed different rules of conduct, since each country
usually recognizes the legitimacy of the other's prescriptive jurisdiction. The
only conflict is a substantive conflict of laws, which can be resolved through
the usual mechanisms.
A conflict over prescriptive jurisdiction arises when one country disputes
the fundamental right of another country to prescribe the rule of conduct at
all. Taking an antitrust example referred to in Atwood's paper, such a conflict
arose in the Watchmakers case, when Switzerland claimed that the United States
had no business regulating the activities of the Swiss watch industry, either
through U.S. antitrust law or otherwise. 4 The United States had prosecuted
the watchmakers' cartel on the theory that it was adversely affecting
competition within the United States, relying on the theory of prescriptive
jurisdiction that permits a nation to create rules for conduct occurring outside
its territory that have effects within the territory. To some degree,
international law recognizes this "objective
territoriality"
theory.
Switzerland, however, disputed both the appropriateness of any use of the
effects doctrine for economic activity and the particular application of the
doctrine on the facts of the case.
Conflicts arise with even greater frequency in another area of international
jurisdiction, usually termed enforcement jurisdiction. 5 This concept refers to
the efforts of a country, through whatever agencies it chooses, to implement
its validly prescribed rules of law. Specific problems might arise in connection
with a request for the production of documents located abroad, an effort to
serve process on a defendant, or an effort to collect a fine imposed as a result
of litigation. Countries are, if anything, even more sensitive to infringements
2. Id. § 402. See also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1315-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
3. France v. Turkey, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (the S.S. Lotus case).
4. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),judgment nodified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a
detailed account of the frictions between Switzerland and the United States occasioned by this
lawsuit, see J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 311-63 (1970).

5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIlE UNITED STATES §§ 20, 40
(1965). The REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 1. distinguishes between enforcement jurisdiction
(§ 431) and adjudicatory jurisdiction (§ 421), while its 1965 predecessor did not. Because the
discussion in the text does not depend upon the distinction drawn in the 1987 version, it follows the
usage of the 1965 version.
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on their exclusive ability to enforce laws within their own territories than to
overreaching exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction. One notorious example of
an international conflict of enforcement jurisdiction arose between the U.S.
courts and the Canadian courts over U.S. discovery requests for Canadian
documents related to the alleged uranium cartel. 6 The question was simple:
Could a U.S. court with proper personal jurisdiction over an individual order
that person to leave the United States, go to Canada, collect papers over the
objection of the Canadian authorities, and return with the papers to the U.S.
court? Many conflicts of jurisdiction between nations are fought at the
enforcement level, although policy disputes on the underlying substantive law
usually lurk in the background.
Sometimes

conflicts

arise

over

both

prescriptive

and

enforcement

jurisdiction, even when substantive disagreements are minimal. The United
Kingdom, for example, has a set of competition laws prohibiting cartels and
restrictive practices, 7 and as a Member State of the European Economic
Community, it also subscribes to the competition rules of articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome." Taken together, these rules are quite similar to the U.S.
antitrust laws. The substantive similarity, however, has not prevented the
most vociferous of jurisdictional disputes between the United States and
Great Britain. 9 The fact that substantive conflicts between the British rules
and the (illegitimate) U.S. rule might be resolvable through one mechanism
or another is beside the point. These jurisdictional disputes have centered on
how broadly the "effects" theory should be construed in matters of economic
policy, with the British position consistently being that it should play a very
little role in economic matters, and the American position being that the
theory has wide scope when significant economic effects in the United States
result from activities abroad. U.S.-U.K. enforcement disputes have tended to
focus on the breadth of American discovery rules, and in particular, the
6. Some of the cases illustrating that conflict are Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Duquesne
Light Co., 16 O.L.R. 273 (1977); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,285 (Can. S. Ct. 1980); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (deferring to
Canadian interests). See also Canadian Practices in International Law during 1978 as Reflected .1ainli in
Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External.-lfairs. 1979 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 334, 33638 (comp. by M. Copithorne) (Diplomatic Note of Canada to the United States).
7. The principal British laws are: the Competition Act 1980; the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act 1976; and the Fair Trading Act 1973. These laws are reproduced in A, COMPETITION LAW IN
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE USA, pt. 3, § UK/L (United Kingdom/Legislation) (D. Gijlsira ed. 1976).
For a general discussion of the British laws, see V. KORAH, COMPETITION LAW OF BRITAIN AND THE
COMMON MARKET (3d ed. 1982).
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 47,
48 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958).
9. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem, Indus. Ltd., [19531 1 ch. 19 (C.A.
1952), [1955] ch. 37 (C.A. 1954) (admittedly decided prior to the British legislation, supra note 7, and
prior to the British accession to the EEC); In re Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litig., 1982-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] 1 All
E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280 (D. D.C.
1984); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See
generally D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE
PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

(1982).
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American penchant for collecting every document conceivably relevant to the
dispute at hand. Again, the conflict over the breadth of enforcement
jurisdiction is independent of the degree of similarity or difference that exists
in the substantive law that will govern the case.
III
DEVICES FOR RESOLVING JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS

A variety of devices for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction have been
developed. The first type of device is allocational in nature. These
allocational rules assign litigation to one court system or another from the
outset of a case. One kind of allocational rule is hierarchical. This rule
attempts to create a pre-existing hierarchy among the various bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction. The country where the activities took place, with the
"pure" territorial jurisdiction, may have the highest claim; the country
that
wishes to prescribe rules for its nationals might be next; and the country
wishing to protect itself against adverse effects from abroad might be last. For
any given conflict, it is necessary only to ascertain the basis of each country's
claim to prescriptive jurisdiction, and to allocate jurisdiction to the country
whose claim is highest on the list. Another allocational rule is the
,jurisdictional rule of reason" originally proposed by Kingman Brewster.' 0
In antitrust cases, that rule requires the court to weigh factors like the relative
significance of the conduct within each country; the extent to which there is an
explicit purpose to harm or affect the forum nation's consumers or the
business opportunities of its citizens; the relative seriousness of effects in the
forum nation compared with those abroad; the nationality or allegiance of
each of the parties, or the corporate location of businesses; the fairness of
applying forum law to the litigants; the degree of conflict between the laws
and policies of the two nations; and the extent to which conflict can be
avoided without seriously impairing the interests of either country. Employing
this kind of balancing process will reveal the "best" basis for prescriptive
jurisdiction in the particular case.
It is also possible to take a consequential approach to jurisdictional
conflicts, under which the basic conflict is ignored and attention is focused
instead on the practical problems that arise from the competing interests of
each nation. If the conflict were over prescriptive jurisdiction, as it was in the
Watchmakers case, this approach would require the court to wait and see
whether existence of the U.S. rule prohibiting cartels ever actually conflicted
as a practical matter with the Swiss rule condoning a cartel structure in the
Swiss watch industry. Actual conflict, in this sense, might be avoided either if
the defendants prevailed on a nonjurisdictional ground or if intervening
events mooted the case. The consequential approach relies heavily on the fact
10.

K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446-448 (1958). Atwood coBREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD (2d ed. 1981).

authored the influential revision of this book. J. ATWOOD & K.
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that the broad theoretical sweep of the effects jurisdiction theory is seldom
carried to its logical extreme in practice. If the metaphysical jurisdictional
conflict between nations never translates into a practical dilemma for the
regulated party, a strong argument exists for disregarding the metaphysical.
The consequential approach has the effect of undervaluing the policy of the
state that has chosen not to regulate, while imposing the costs of litigating on
the affected parties even if the final outcome produces an acceptable
resolution of the conflict. Enforcement jurisdiction clashes are typically
resolved by U.S. courts in a consequential way. Discovery conflicts in which
U.S. law appears to permit discovery into certain matters while a foreign
blocking statute appears to prohibit it are commonplace. Following the
famous Interhandel case,'I a U.S. court will issue an order requiring discovery
and will determine whether the foreign litigant complies in good faith. Once
this process has been exhausted, the propriety and severity of sanctions for
noncompliance can be assessed most accurately.
The last approach to conflict resolution at the jurisdictional stage may be
thought of as an absolutist one. Once a particular country is satisfied that its
own claim to jurisdiction is validly based, both the desirability and the need to
adopt any conflict avoidance mechanism vanish. The famous Alcoa antitrust
decision adopted an absolutist approach when Judge Hand concluded that
U.S. jurisdiction existed whenever the foreign parties intended to affect U.S.
12
commerce and their conduct had an actual effect within the United States.
Some applications of the jurisdictional rule of reason have been more
absolutist than allocational. If U.S. jurisdiction appears to be reasonable
upon consideration of the six, eight, or ten appropriate factors, the court
proceeds with the case regardless of the potentially superior claim of another
country. 13
IV
ORDOVER AND ATwoOD:

ALLOCATIONAL RULES IN OPERATION

Both Ordover and Atwood adopt an

allocational

approach

to the

resolution of jurisdictional conflicts. Although Ordover eventually concedes
that "if the effect in the United States is substantial in absolute terms,
irrespective of the effect abroad, this ought to be enough to claim
jurisdiction,"' 14 which sounds like an absolutist approach, his paper is devoted
mostly to the establishment of allocational rules. With a rather idiosyncratic
use of the term "foreign sovereign compulsion," Ordover argues that
jurisdiction should be allocated partly on the basis of the kind of industrial
11. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S.
197 (1958).
12. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
13. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.23 (7th Cir. 1980).
14. Ordover, Conflicts of Juyisdiction: Antitrust and Industrial PolicY, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1987, at 165, 176-77.
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policies the countries in question are pursuing and partly on the basis of the
single-firm or multiple-firm nature of the challenged conduct. His version of
the sovereign compulsion defense does not include the usual concerns about
whether the foreign government actually compelled behavior or encouraged
or tolerated it, or about whether the foreign order was issued and took effect
within the territory of the foreign government. Instead, Ordover's version
appears to be synonymous with election of the foreign rule over the U.S.
rule.' 5 He advocates a broad "sovereign compulsion defense"-that is,
primacy for the permissive country's jurisdiction to regulate-when singlefirm conduct or industrial policies designed to cure market failure or to
pursue some socioeconomic objective are at issue. When the industrial policy
is designed to transfer firms' profits or consumer surplus from abroad to the
regulating country, or when hard-core collusive behavior is at issue, he
advocates a narrow "sovereign compulsion defense," under which
jurisdictional primacy is allocated to the country that is attempting to prohibit
the conduct. 16

Atwood's allocational rule would operate quite differently. It is essentially
hierarchical in nature: The country in which a "pure export cartel" meeting
his criteria was established would automatically have the higher claim to
prescriptive jurisdiction. 1 7 Since that country obviously has declared the
cartel to be legal, U.S. courts should decline any invitation to examine the
possible illegality of the cartel under U.S. law by refusing to accept
jurisdiction over the case. As hierarchical rules go, Atwood's is quite ad hoc.
If his arguments were to be generalized, a hierarchical rule for every kind of
possibly anticompetitive arrangement that exists in world affairs would have
to be found. One might decide, for instance, that distributional arrangements
are always governed by the laws of the place of distribution, that mergers are
always governed by the place where the formal transfers of assets or stock take
place, and that cartels not meeting Atwood's criteria are governed by the law
of each place in which sales are actually made. Conflicts scholars will
recognize in this scheme a strong resemblance to the approach of the first
Restatement of Conflicts, under which a fixed rule for each kind of conflict

15. This could be phrased more generally as an election of the permissive competition rule over
the restrictive competition rule. In the past, the United States has always had the restrictive rule and
the foreign government has always had the permissive rule. Developments in U.S. antitrust doctrine
of recent years, however, in areas such as vertical restraints, leave open the clear possibility of a
future conflict in which the U.S. rule is the permissive one and the foreign rule is the restrictive one.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES, reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 6263
(1985); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Compare the EEC rules on
selective distribution, discussed in Schroeter, The Application of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty to Distribution
Agreements-Principles and Recent Developments, 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 375.

See also AEG-

Telefunken v. EEC, 1983 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 315 1. For simplicity, the discussion in the text follows
the traditional scenario, in which the United States is trying to prohibit something that a foreign
government wishes to permit.
16. Ordover, supra note 14, at 176.
17. Atwood, Conflicts of Jwisdiction In the Antitrust Field: The Example of Export Cartels, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 153, 160-164.
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was offered.1 8 They will also note that this approach has been rejected by
modern writers as being unduly rigid, insensitive to the policy reasons for
choosing one law or another, and in many situations unworkable in practice.' 9
Atwood himself, of course, does not suggest generalizing his solution, and he
implicitly concedes that the "pure export cartels" that he addresses are quite
rare. He may prefer a hybrid solution, under which hierarchical allocational
rules govern some jurisdictional conflicts, absolutist rules govern others, and
consequential solutions remain for the rest. Such a system would hardly be
conducive to conflict reduction, however, since the rules for conflict
resolution would themselves become a fertile source of disagreement.
V
COMMENT AND CRITICISM

The merits and demerits of the two principal proposals lie at opposite
ends of the spectrum. Ordover's emphasis on the underlying motivation of
industrial policy is particularly interesting, because he persuasively argues
that the welfare effects and externalities of different kinds of policies will vary,
and the legitimate foreign interest in overriding another country's policy is in
part a function of what the regulating country is trying to do. His system also
has the virtue of avoiding the perennial debate about "true" compulsion
versus other modes of expression of government policy. The problem with
Ordover's approach is more practical. It seems utterly unworkable in
practice, and if it were attempted, the approach would lead to far greater
tensions between the competing nations than does the present system. This is
because no "sovereign compulsion defense" as he defines it could be
recognized, or even defined in scope, until the U.S. court had undertaken an
elaborate investigation of the real foreign policy that lay behind the private
parties' conduct.
It would not be easy, in practice, to distinguish between industrial policies
motivated by socioeconomic concerns and those policies designed to capture
20
profits and surplus from foreigners. The OPEC case provides a useful test.
Was the cartel motivated by socioeconomic concerns? Certainly. All of the
member countries of OPEC attempted to use their oil wealth to improve the
lot of their citizenry. Was the cartel designed to capture foreign consumer
surplus? Yes. OPEC was a concerted and successful effort to shift the terms
of trade in favor of the resource-rich countries. Was OPEC designed to
correct for some kind of market failure? Conceivably so. Oil and gas fields
are not necessarily exploited at the optimal rate in the absence of some kind
18.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1934).

See generally J.

ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
19. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1-5
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW

(3d ed. 1977); R.

BEALE,

A

TREATISE

(1962); R.

LEFLAR,

WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

(3d

ed. 1986).
20.

International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afftd, 649

F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
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of regulation. What should a court do under those circumstances? Put
differently, would the task of the California federal district court have been
any easier when the Machinists filed their lawsuit if industrial policy analysis
had been necessary? It seems unlikely. Moreover, Ordover's distinction
between single-firm and concerted behavior would not have resolved the
conflict, since he condemns collusive behavior like OPEC's more harshly. In
the end, neither classification based on industrial policy type nor a distinction
between single-firm and collusive activity seems likely to function well as a
2
conflict reduction or resolution device. '
Atwood's approach is eminently practical. Anyone should be able to look
at a particular export cartel and determine whether its members include only
producers from within a single country's territory (formally, of courseshareholder identity would have to be disregarded); whether the cartel has
been publicly registered; and whether its overt collaborative behavior is
confined strictly to the territory of the country in question. One difficulty
here is the absence of a significant relationship between these characteristics
and the legitimate regulatory interest of either country. The cartels that
Atwood has defined seem to correspond almost perfectly with Ordover's third
category-those with no economic justification other than a transfer of wealth
from foreigners to the sponsoring country. The mere fact that many
countries actually sponsor this kind of cartel in no way suggests that a
gentlemanly "hands off" attitude is the best resolution of the conflict. The
enactment in the United States of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 198222 points to a different rationale for tolerance of export cartels,
and to a different type of conflict resolution. That Act established that the
U.S. antitrust laws regulate only the U.S. market. The laws do not exist for
the protection of foreign consumers, except insofar as foreigners are the
incidental beneficiaries of the protection of U.S. consumers. The United
States allows export cartels to form as long as no impermissible U.S. effect is
created, and it leaves foreign countries free to regulate those cartels,
depending on their substantive economic policies and the existence of
significant economic effects within their territories. The allocational rule is
based on the presence or absence of effects within a territory. This rule is
preferable to one that, almost perversely, allows the country attempting to
seize foreign producer or consumer surplus to regulate, and forbids
regulation to the country where the misallocation of resources is felt most
strongly.
Part of Atwood's argument rests on the proposition that the United States
has now "accepted" a full-blown jurisdictional rule of reason, which in his
view appears to operate in an allocational way rather than absolutely. The
21. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, (1986). Compare,
for example, the treatment of IBM in the case before the Commission of the European Communities
(the settlement of which was reported in 17 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (No. 10) 96-103 (1984) and in
17 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (No. 7/8) 7-9 (1984)), with the dismissal of the U.S. government's case

against the same company, discussed in In re IBM, 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982).
22. Pub. L. No. 97-290, § 402, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)).
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state of the law, however, is less clear than he suggests. Some courts have
adopted an exceptionally open-ended jurisdictional rule of reason, and others
have fundamentally rejected jurisdictional rules of reason as beyond the
competence of a court. 23 Representatives of the Department of Justice have

testified before Congress that the kinds of factors courts should weigh should
be objectively ascertainable, basically taking an absolutist approach to the
problem. 24 Unless and until Congress speaks to the subject or a definitive
resolution appears from the Supreme Court, the most that can accurately be
said about jurisdictional rules of reason is that they have been, for the last
25
decade, the subject of experiments in the lower courts of the United States.
VI
CONCLUSION

Conflicts of jurisdiction to regulate economic conditions are not likely to
disappear from the modern world. For the same reason that protectionism in
trade laws sends a siren song to national legislatures, and beggar thy neighbor
policies have a way of looking better than they actually are, efforts to reap
monopoly rents from foreigners without paying a domestic price in the form
of resource misallocations are likely to continue. Furthermore, as Ordover
has noted, competition is only one of a number of possible industrial policies
a country might adopt, and other policies may be more compelling to
particular nations at particular times. The resolution of these conflicts will
never be easy. The most effective and simplistic resolutions, such as the
abolition of all forms of prescriptive jurisdiction other than pure territorial
jurisdiction, are fatally flawed in light of the transnational character of the
bulk of today's economic activity. No one would seriously favor allowing
multinationals to play off one country against another or to relocate in
permissive regulatory havens with impunity.
With the acceptance of effects jurisdiction, however, more sophisticated
conflict resolution devices become necessary. The following solution may
help to address some of the problems noted in the Ordover and Atwood
articles. As a first cut, absolutist rules of jurisdiction that require significant
effects in the regulating country should be formulated. This kind of rule
necessitates the least amount of interference by one country's courts with
another country's policies. At the same time, absolutist rules maintain a
23. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting jurisdictional balancing test); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d
6, 8-9 (2d Cir. 1981) (less reliance on "rule of reason"); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (advocating broad jurisdictional balancing test); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 606-15 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378, 1382-86 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) (broad
jurisdictional balancing test).
24. See e.g., The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985: Hearings on S. 397 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of Charles F. Rule). See also S. 2164,
99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. 2288-89 (1986) (introduced Mar. 7, 1986, by Sen. Strom
Thurmond).
25. See REVISED RESTATEMENT, supra note 1.
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reasonable link between jurisdictional rules and substantive policies. To the
extent that conflicts remain, as some surely will, consequential devices can be
used as a secondary corrective measure. Those devices include the foreign
sovereign compulsion or act of state defense, which remain after the initial
jurisdictional determination has been made. Many times the substantive law
creating liability will not extend to behavior commanded by a competent
sovereign, just as the antitrust laws do not ban certain practices undertaken
under the aegis of state regulation. 26 Courts will refuse to look into the
validity of certain acts of foreign states, which may include some kinds of
foreign compulsion. 27
Finally, in the enforcement context, sovereign
compulsion may be taken into account by a court in deciding how severely to
penalize less than complete cooperation. If the consequential devices also fail
to resolve the jurisdictional conflict, it may be necessary to resolve the
problem diplomatically, rather than legally.
At the international level, the best that can be hoped for is conflict
management, rather than conflict abolition. The analytical scheme proposed
here, if applied properly, would accomplish that goal not only for antitrust but
for any area in which the interests and policies of many nations are so
inevitably tied together.

26. See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
27. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See also International Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897).

